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This Working Paper forms part of the CBR Research Programme on Enterprise 
and Innovation Abstract 
This article  analyses the impact of the  participation of venture capital (VC) 
firms on underpricing in 372 businesses brought to IPO during the period 1999-
2001 in KOSDAQ. Korea’s second-tier stock market, KOSDAQ, has grown 
dramatically since 1999 and about half of the firms listed in KOSDAQ during 
this period were VC-backed, thus providing a good testing ground for empirical 
analysis. We measure VC participation in terms of pre IPO share-ownership by 
VC firms and attempt to differentiate IPO impacts between VCs grouped in 
terms of their reputation (measured by their dominance of the VC market, and 
by their affiliation in terms of ownership by banks and security companies). In 
estimating impacts we control for a wide range of variables which may affect 
the extent of underpricing. These include uncertainty inducing factors such as 
the age, size, profitability, leverage, and technical riskiness (measured by sector 
and R&D intensity) of the firm brought to IPO. We also control for market 
conditions using proxies for hot and cold market effects based on the numbers 
of contemporaneous IPOs, underpricing trends and market price movements. 
Finally in addition to allowing for the impact of underwriting quality we control 
for share overhang and price revision effects. We find that, controlling for other 
relevant  factors,  pre-IPO  ownership  by  VCs  has  an  insignificantly  negative 
impact on underpricing in both hot and cold markets. However in cold markets 
reputational effects within the VC group do matter. In those conditions the top 3 
VCs and those owned by or affiliated with banks are significantly associated 
with  lower  underpricing.  The  same  is  true  for  the  quality  of  underwriting. 
However in hot market conditions none of these effects are present.  
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A. Introduction 
"What's in a name? That which we call a rose 
By any other word would smell as sweet."  
William Shakespeare Romeo and Juliet (II, ii, 1-2) 
 
Numerous  studies  have  documented  the  fact  that  in  all  countries  IPOs  are 
underpriced  in  the  short-run  (Loughran,  Ritter  et  al,  2003),  In  the  US,  this 
‘underpricing discount’ has averaged over 10%, since the 1960s reaching over 
65%  at  the  height  of  the  stock  market  boom  in  1999-2000  (Ritter,  2005). 
Among the 34 countries surveyed by Loughran and Ritter, only 4 countries 
showed less-than-10% initial returns, with no stock markets exhibiting negative 
initial returns. In the course of the eighties and nineties IPOs on the Korean 
Stock Exchange exhibited persistent underpricing between 57% and 60%, rates 
much higher in the USA (Kim et al., 1995; Kim et al., 2002). On the Korean 
Securities Dealers Automated Quotation exchange (KOSDAQ), the secondary 
stock market founded in 1996, our estimates suggest that underpricing reached 
280% during the period from 1999 to March 2000 and 119% from then until the 
end of 2001.  
 
The pervasive nature of underpricing has been explained in a number of ways 
related  to  problems  of  information  asymmetry.  Thus  it  has  been  seen  as  a 
signalling mechanism to combat the ‘lemons problem’ (Allen and Faulhaber, 
1989; Grinblatt and Hwang, 1989; Welch, 1989), as a response to the ‘winner’s 
curse’  faced  by  less-informed  investors  (Rock,  1986),  and  as  a  reward  to 
investors for market information feedback (Barry, Gilson et al, 1998). In this 
paper, we focus on the role that reputable financial institutions may play in 
ameliorating these information asymmetry and signalling problems (Beatty and 
Ritter,  1986;  Carter  and  Manaster  1990;  Carter,  Dark  et  al,  1998;  Logue, 
Rogalski et al, 2002).  
 
In this paper, we examine whether the names that these institutions associate 
with IPOs makes the IPO rose smell sweeter to investors. Put more prosaically 
and specifically we analyse the impact on underpricing of the participation of 
venture capital (VC) firms in 372 firms brought to IPO during the period 1999-
2001 in KOSDAQ. Korea’s second-tier stock market, KOSDAQ, has grown 
dramatically since 1999 and about half of the firms listed in KOSDAQ during 
this period were VC-backed, thus providing a good testing ground for empirical 
analysis. We measure VC participation in terms of pre IPO share-ownership by   2 
VC firms and attempt to differentiate IPO impacts between VCs grouped in 
terms of their reputation (measured by their dominance of the VC market, and 
by their affiliation in terms of ownership by banks and security companies). In 
estimating  impacts  we  control  for  a  wide  range  of  variables  which  may 
affecting the extent of underpricing. These include uncertainty inducing factors 
such as the age, size, profitability, leverage, and technical riskiness (measured 
by sector and R&D intensity) of the firm brought to IPO. We also control for 
market conditions using proxies for hot and cold market effects based on the 
numbers  of  contemporaneous  IPOs,  underpricing  trends  and  market  price 
movements.  Finally  in  addition  to  allowing  for  the  impact  of  underwriting 
quality we control for share overhang and price revision effects. We find that, 
controlling  for  other  relevant  factors,  pre-IPO  ownership  by  VCs  has  an 
insignificantly negative impact on underpricing in both hot and cold markets. 
However in cold markets reputational effects within the VC group do matter. In 
those conditions the top 3 VCs and those owned by or affiliated with banks are 
significantly  associated  with  lower  underpricing.  The  same  is  true  for  the 
quality of underwriting. However in hot market conditions none of these effects 
are present.  
 
The  article  is  organised  as  follows.  Section  B  provides  an  institutional 
description  of  the  venture  capital  industry  and  the  IPO  market  in  Korea  in 
comparison to the USA and the UK. In Section C, we review the literature 
regarding  underpricing.  Section  D  describes  the  data  set  and  discusses  the 
methodology to be used. Section E describes the main characteristics of our IPO 
samples and reports the results of univariate tests on underpricing. Section F 
reports the results of multivariate analysis of underpricing. Section G concludes.  
 
 
B. Institutional Background 
 
B.1. IPOs Underpricing and Stock Market Movements: 1999-2001 
 
Figure I shows monthly movements in the numbers of IPOs initial returns on 
the IPOs and movements in the KOSDAQ and KSE (Korean Stock Exchange) 
indices. The number of IPOs peaked in December 1999, fell sharply to February 
2000 and then followed a series of lower peaks and troughs through to the end 
of the sample period. The IPO market was thus still able to attract more than 20 
firms in some months after the crash of early 2000, unlike IPO markets in other 
major countries which witnessed a more consistent freeze. The initial return (or 
underpricing) follows the number of IPOs with a one to two month lag peaking 

































































































































































































































































































































































































































   4 
A comparison of the top and bottom panels of Figure 1 shows that movements 
in the number of IPOs each month is more volatile than, but broadly consistent 
with,  movements  in  the  KOSDAQ  and  KOSPI  indices.  The  peaks  in 
underpricing  coincide  more  closely  with  the  recovery  and  peaks  in  the 
KOSDAQ index than with the number of IPOs. The KOSDAQ index reached 
its  highest  point  in  March  2000;  three  months  after  KOSDAQ  recorded  the 
highest number of IPOs. IPO numbers tend to rise when the indices are rising as 
IPOs  sought  to  capture  the  ‘window  of  opportunity’  of  rising  markets 
(Aggarwal and Rivoli, 1990; Lowry and Schwert, 2002). However, while the 
KOSDAQ index continued to decline after March 2000 and did not recover to 
its previous highest level, firms continued to make their debut in KOSDAQ. In 
fact, 235 firms (63% in our sample) were taken public between May 2000 and 
September 2001.   
 
In view of the movements in the rate of IPO activity over our sample period we 
present results for the whole period and for two periods split in March 2000, the 
first we term the hot period and the second from April 2000 we term the cold 
period. In the cold period both underpricing and stock market indices are below 
the peak values of February and March 2002. 
 
B.2. Venture Capital Investment 1999-2002 
 
The Korean venture capital industry experienced dramatic growth from the late 
1990s and became the largest venture capital market relative to its economy in 
the Asian countries (OECD, 2003). In the period 1998-2001 Korea ranked third 
behind the USA and Canada in terms of venture capital investment as a share of 
GDP among the leading OECD countries. In the aftermath of the East Asian 
Financial Crisis and the subsequent restructuring of the Korean financial system 
venture capital commitment reached a peak of USD 1.1 billion in 2000 before 




Table I   Descriptive Statistics of the Venture Capital Industry in USA, UK and Korea 
 
      1999        2000        2001        2002   
    US  UK  Korea    US  UK  Korea    US  UK Korea    US  UK Korea 
A. Venture Capital Commitment 
(Million$)    62,770  9,386  431    105,800  13,434  1,133    37,940  19,828  597    7,670  12,600  440 
                                 
B. Disbursement by stage                                  
% Seed and Start-up    6.1  8.5  0.4    3.0  6.2  12.4    1.9  8.0      1.4  5.9   
% Early stage    22.0  14.6  0.8    24.6  18.7  20.1    22.6  11.2      19.2  11.7   
% Expansion    56.1  65.2  97.8    57.3  71.2  67.2    57.2  66.1      62.7  67.0   
% Later stage    15.9  11.7  1.0    15.2  3.9  0.2    18.3  14.7      16.7  15.3   
Total (Million$)    54,924  2,427  1,017    106,294  4,219  1,137    41,073  2,946  NA    21,224  2,686  NA 
                                 
C. Disbursement by industry 
 (Number  of Firms)                                 
% Information Technology    51.0  29.7  71.3    54.4  50.3  64.2    58.0  38.3  66.3    58.8  31.4   
% Bio-technology/Medical    12.6  10.0  4.4    9.8  5.3  10.1    14.4  11.4  12.5    19.1  14.1   
% Non high-technology    36.4  60.3  24.3    35.8  44.3  25.7    27.6  50.3  21.2    22.1  54.5   
Total (Million$)    4,499  1,109  136    6,459  1,182  567    3,847  1,307  208    2,514  1,196  NA 
 
Sources: National Venture Capital Association (2001, 2002, 2003), European Venture Capital Association Yearbooks (2001, 2002, 2003), 
Korean Venture Capital Association (2001, 2002, 2003)   6 
A noticeable characteristic of the Korean venture capital industry compared to 
the  US  is  that  venture  capital  investment  tends  to  be  concentrated  in  the 
expansion stage. Table I shows for example that in 1999, 97.8% (USD 994.8 
million) was directed toward the expansion stage compared with 56.1% in the 
US. In 1999, very little venture capital was invested in the seed and start-up 
stages and the early stage (0.4 and 0.8%, respectively), but the proportion of 
these  stages  in  venture  capital  investment  soared  in  2000,  with  12.4%  and 
20.1% being invested coincident with the boom in IPOs and KOSDAQ. In that 
year seed funding was proportionately much higher than in either the US or the 
UK. Since this early stage funding is inherently riskier than later stage funding, 
this may predispose the system to display higher underpricing in that year. 
 
Table  I  also  shows  that  the  Korean  venture  capital  investment  is  relatively 
concentrated  in  firms  in  the  two  high  tech  sectors  of  information  and  bio 
technology and especially the former. Compared to the UK and the US, Korean 
venture capital is much less involved with low tech investment. Out of the total 
number of investee firms, information technology industries accounted for over 
two thirds in each year from 1999 to 2001. The proportion of the biotechnology 
firms  that  received  venture  capital  funding  increased  from  4.4%  in  1999  to 
12.5% in 2001. Once again this may relate to higher levels of underpricing on 
KOSDAQ in that year. More generally the higher R&D intensity of high tech 
IPOs means that they present greater uncertainty of outcomes to investors (Guo, 
Lev and Shi, 2006). In view of these differences in risk profile between high 
and low technology ventures, we distinguish between them in our subsequent 




C. Hypothesis Development 
 
C.1. Information Asymmetry Underpricing and Irrational Behaviour 
 
The dominant approach to the analysis of underpricing centres around problems 
of information asymmetry and problems of signalling. For example, to separate 
themselves from the lower-quality issuers who bring ‘lemons’ to the market, it 
has  been  argued  that  higher  quality  issuers  who  are  better  informed  than 
investors will price the IPO below its true value. Lower quality issuers will find 
it hard to imitate. This kind of signal can be reinforced by the announcement of 
high  dividends  (earnings)  after  IPO  (Allen  and  Faulhaber,  1989),  ensuring 
positive  analyst  coverage  (Chemmanur  and  Fulghieri  1998),  future  issuing 
activities by selling additional shares on more favourable conditions (Welch, 
1989), and retained ownership (Grinblatt and Hwang, 1989). In the latter case 
issuers are able to get back the costs of IPO underpricing by selling the shares   7 
they retained at a higher price after IPO. Alternatively when some investors 
have better or different information than others, IPO stocks may be also be 
underpriced to maintain the market. Thus in Rock’s (1986) “winner’s curse” 
model, well-informed investors will only subscribe to issues that are sufficiently 
underpriced relative to the firms’ true value to earn an abnormal return. Less-
informed investors will be allocated all of the undesirable relatively overpriced 
issues  avoided  by  well-informed  investors.  The  less  informed  group  will 
withdraw  from  the  market  unless  underpricing  is  available  to  offset  this 
‘winners curse’ risk. Where issuers want to obtain information about market 
demand  and  the  “bookbuilding”  method  is  used  for  setting  the  offer  price, 
issuers  may  underprice  IPOs  to  induce  regular  investors  to  reveal  their 
information about their truthful valuations on the firms. (Benveniste and Spindt, 
1989). When revealed market demand is high, the offer price will be set higher 
than  the  original  price.  The  price  that  investors  extract  to  supply  this 
information will however be either underpricing and/or higher share allocation 
(Ritter, 1998; Chang and Kim, 2006).  
 
It is important to note that these approaches are fundamentally based around 
notions  of  rational  behaviour  by  stock  market  actors.  The  growth  in 
underpricing associated with the stock market boom of the 1990s has led to 
other  explanations  in  which  underpricing  is  interpreted  as  the  outcome  of 
irrational behaviour. Thus Aggarwal and Rivoli (1990) argue that high levels of 
underpricing are caused by “market fads” which can be defined as temporary 
overvaluation of firms by investors in the early IPO stage. Higher levels of 
noise trading are likely to happen not in accordance with rational expectation on 
the firms’ value, but according to irrational over-optimism. Similarly Rajan and 
Servaes (1997) attribute higher underpricing in bull markets to over-optimism 
about earnings potential and long-term growth prospects which may become 
self  reinforcing  through  contagion  effects  and  changes  in  bookbuilding 
behaviour  (Loughran  and  Ritter  (2002)  and  Lowry  and  Schwert  (2002)) 
Empirical  analysis  of  the  determinants  of  underpricing  must  therefore  be 
sensitive to the market background against which they occur not least to avoid 
aggregation biases by combining observations over differing market conditions.  
 
   8 
C.2.  Information  Asymmetry  Certification  and  Reputation  Effects:  Advisers, 
Venture Capitalists and Underwriters 
 
C.2.1 Auditors Financial Advisers and Underwriter Quality 
 
An  important  strand  of  the  signalling  literature  emphasises  the  information 
content  of  “reputation”  and  the  role  that  certain  institutions  involved  in  the 
issuing process can play in certifying the quality of firms brought to IPO. Here 
issuers attempt to alleviate the degree of information asymmetry by signalling 
quality through the use of highly prestigious underwriters, auditors or financial 
advisors in the process of IPO. Titman and Truman (1986) suggest that the 
employment of a prestigious auditor or other financial advisors to the issuing 
company may be interpreted by investors as a positive signal of issue value, 
leading to less underpricing. Holland and Horton (1993) examine the relation 
between  the  reputations  of  the  professional  advisors  involved  in  IPO 
(specifically,  the  sponsor,  the  accountant  and  the  auditor)  and  short-term 
performance.  They  find  that  more  reputable  financial  advisors  are  linked  to 
lower initial returns. Similar results obtain for underwriter quality (Kim, Kish 
and Vasconcellos, 2002; Carter, Dark et al, 1998; Carter and Manaster, 1990) 
 
 
C.2.3 Venture Capitalists: Certification and Conflicts of Interest Effects 
 
In addition to the reputational effects of financial advisers a significant literature 
has focussed on the role of venture capitalists (VCs) in certifying and hence 
signalling IPO quality. This literature has also focussed on potential conflicts of 
interest which may arise as a result of venture capital involvement when venture 
capital firms are affiliated with other institutions involved in underwriting or 
investing in IPO firms ( Barry, Muscarella et al., 1990; Megginson and Weiss, 
1991; Admati and Pfleidefer 1994; Espenlaub, Garrett et.al., 1999; Francis and 
Hasan, 2001; Gompers and Lerner, 1999; Gompers, 1996; Chan, Siegel et al., 
1990; Bessler and Kurth, 2003; Hamao, Packer et al., 2000; Hellman and Puri 
2000a, 2000b; Jain and Kini, 2000; Rindermann, 2002; Lee and Wahal, 2004; 




The certification role of VC involvement in IPO firms is linked to the various 
features of their practice which may signal that the firms they invest in are of 
relatively high quality. As a result to attract investors at IPO they require less 
money to be left on the table through underpricing. This effect is based on the 
use of various investment control and resource allocation mechanisms designed 
to reduce the risks associated with start up businesses especially in the high   9 
return technology based sectors deemed to be attractive to VCs and in which 
venture capitalists often invest through risk spreading syndicates in which one 
or more venture capitalists play the leading role (Admati and Pfleiderer, 1994; 
Lerner, 1994). VC backed IPOs, it is argued, will be of higher quality or lower 
uncertainty  in  performance  because  of  VC  investment  and  monitoring  and 
support  strategies  for  their  portfolio  firms.  These  strategies  include  staged 
financing linked to performance and convertible debt instruments for effective 
monitoring and incentive alignment. (Sahlman, 1990; Gompers, 1995; Gompers 
and Lerner, 1996; Cornelli and Yosha, 1997). In addition firm quality may be 
improved  by  specialist  strategic  VC  guidance,  identification  and  recruitment 
and incentivisation of top management, and by specialist VC network support 
(Kortum  and  Lerner  1998;  Hellmann  and  Puri,  2000a;  Stuart,  Hoang  et  al. 
1999). Finally it is argued that venture capitalists have an incentive to bring 
good quality firms to IPO because they are “repeated players” in the IPO market 
who require IPO to exit their investments. As a result venture capitalists will 
invest in careful screening, selecting and monitoring of investee firms, to avoid 
losing their reputation by taking the poorly qualified firms to the IPO market 
(Espenlaub and Garrett, 1999; Jain and Kini, 2000).  
 
For all these reasons it might be expected that in the Korean stock market, 
venture  capitalists’  involvement  in  the  ownership  of  IPO  firms  will  send  a 
positive signal to the capital markets. In a stock market such as KOSDAQ, 
which has a short track record, public investors will, it could be argued, have 
less  accumulated  information  about  the  high-technology  focused  IPOs  that 
prevailed during the period of our research. In our empirical analysis, if these 
effects predominate we would expect venture capital-backed IPOs to be less 
underpriced, compared with IPOs which are not backed by venture capital. 
 
 
Heterogeneity in VC Quality, VC affiliation and Conflicts of Interest  
While  there  is  a  body  of  literature  proposing  the  certifying  role  of  venture 
capitalists, another body of literature stresses potential offsetting effects arising 
from heterogeneity amongst venture capital firms and from conflicts of interest.  
 
Gompers (1996) observed that venture capitalists caught up in rising markets 
would bring firms to market prematurely to satisfy their need for exit even if 
this timing was less than appropriate given the maturity of the business. Thus in 
rising markets the certifying role is weakened. He also observed that within the 
VC sector newer venture capitalists were, in general, more prone to do this. 
This behaviour termed ‘grandstanding’ leads younger VC companies to bring 
IPOs to the public market earlier than more established firms in order to raise 
their  own  profile.  IPOs  sponsored  by  inexperienced  and  younger  venture 
capitalist should therefore be more underpriced.    10 
 
Korea’s venture capitalist market has a relatively short history. The majority of 
firms  were  established  after  the  regulatory  changes  in  1998,  which  were 
designed  to  encourage  the  foundation  of  more  venture  capital  companies  in 
order to promote technology financing. The likelihood of grandstanding effects 
may therefore be substantial. In addition, variations in venture capital quality 
are  likely  to  be  present  so  that  the  impact  of  venture  capital  presence  on 
underpricing is likely to be influenced by investor perceptions of VC quality. Of 
around Korean 120 venture capital companies, only around 20 appear in the 
ownership section of the IPO prospectus of IPO firms. Thus leadership in terms 
of market share may be taken as a signal of VC quality. 
 
In  a  market  in  which  historically  a  few  key  banks  and  security  firms  have 
dominated  affairs  and  have  established  reputations  VC  affiliation  with  them 
may lead to less underpricing than when these affiliations are not present. Thus 
IPOs  backed  by  venture  capitalist  firms  which  differ  according  to  their 
ownership may have different impacts on underpricing. (Gompers and Lerner, 
1999; Hamao, Packer et al., 2000; Li and Masulis, 2003; Bessler and Kurth, 
2003).  
 
Conflicts  of  interests  arise  when  these  affiliations  lead  to  differences  in 
motivation in IPO pricing and where financial market structures lead to multiple 
interconnections between investment banking, underwriting and venture capital 
functions and the role of institutions as both investors and promoters of IPOs. 
Gompers and Lerner (1999) focus on the conflicts of interest that can occur 
between underwriters who hold an equity stake in IPO firms through venture 
capital  subsidiaries  and  investors.  They  note  the  possibility  that,  when 
investment  banks  (security  firms  in  the  Korean  context)  underwrite  IPO 
businesses in which they have shares through a venture capital subsidiary, they 
may incur conflicts of interest between investors and themselves. An investment 
bank (security firm) has an incentive to set a high price for IPO shares as an 
agent of the IPO firm. This incentive is strengthened when it has ownership 
rights in the IPO company. However, the investment bank (security firm) has an 
offsetting concern about losing its reputation by pricing the IPO firms too high 
and  weakening  its  links  with  institutional  and  other  investors  who  are  their 
long-term  clients  on  the  demand-side.  The  IPO  offer  will  be  thus  be  the 
outcome of several conflicting concerns. When investors anticipate this conflict 
of  interests,  they  will  require  a  discount  on  the  IPO  pricing  to  reflect  the 
uncertainty  it  creates,  which  will  result  in  a  higher  underpricing.  This  will 
reinforce the self-interested tendency for underwriters to underprice in order to 
avoid expensive buy-ins. VC affiliation with investment banks (security firms) 
involved in the underpricing process should lead to higher underpricing. To the 
extent that the need to underprice is weakened in bull markets with typically   11 
excess demand then we would expect this effect to be weakened or offset in 
those  circumstances.  In  empirical  analysis,  it  is  therefore  important  to  both 
identify  VCs  affiliated  with  investment  banks  (security  firms)  and  analyse 
effects allowing for hot and cold market conditions.  
 
The  argument  for  a  distinct  certification  role  of  “bank-affiliated”  venture 
capitalists  depends  upon  their  particular  “information  advantage”  over  other 
financial  institutions  based  on  specialist  personnel  linked  to  client  fund 
transmission,  the  screening  of  loan  applicants,  monitoring  client  firms’ 
managerial performance and profits, and enforcing specific contracts that are 
designed to modify managerial behaviour (Hellman et.al.,2003; Calomiris and 
Ramirez, 1996). Banks which also hold shares in clients can reduce the agency 
costs associated with debt (Prowse, 1990; Aoki, 1994) and may be more willing 
to provide funding for long-term investment (Edwards and Fischer, 1994). As 
Aoki (2000) has argued relational financing in bank based financial systems 
makes  the  banks’  role  in  gathering  information  central.  It  generates 
‘informational  rents’,  which  in  our  context  can  be  translated  into  positive 
reputational effects.  
 
If all these certifying and value-adding functions of banks are recognised in the 
market, IPO firms backed by banks-affiliated venture capital companies should 
be expected to experience less underpricing than those which are not. 
  
Uncertainty and Underpricing: Control and other Variables 
It is well known that variables other than the outside ownership and reputational 
factors that we have discussed so far can affect underpricing. In particular a 
range of factors are associated with uncertainty in firm performance and the 
motivation of the original entrepreneurial owners. These may both predispose 
venture  capitalists  to  focus  on  certain  types  of  firms  whose  underlying 
characteristics may be reflected, in relatively high or low levels of underpricing 
and produce misleading estimates of the impact of VC involvement unless their 
impact is controlled for (Rindermann, 2002; Gompers and Lerner, 2001; Lee 
and Wahal, 2004; Daily et.al., 2003). Both small business size and youth are 
associated  with  uncertainty  in  business  performance,  as  are  high  levels  of 
leverage. Each may be expected to lead to higher underpricing (Carter et al., 
1998;  Ibbotson  et  al.,  1994;  Megginson  and  Weiss,  1991).  Similarly  high 
technology and R&D intensive businesses are more risky than other types of 
IPO (Guo et al., 2006) with similar implications for underpricing. Finally, pre-
IPO profitability should be a positive signal of quality as should the extent to 
which the CEO of an IPO firm holds equity and is committed to its retention 
post-IPO. Both should lead to lower underpricing although the evidence on the 
CEO effect is mixed (Beatty, 1989; Kim et al., 1995). We include variables for 
each of these effects in our empirical analysis.   12 
 
In addition to these variables relating to the characteristics of the IPO firm two 
other variables arising from the IPO process have been identified as factors 
affecting the degree of underpricing. Benveniste and Spindt (1989) argue that, 
where the bookbuilding method is used for setting the offer price, security firms 
may  underprice  IPOs  in  order  to  induce  regular  investors  to  reveal  their 
information about their truthful valuations of the firm. To encourage investor 
honesty,  these  firms  then  compensate  investors  by  underpricing  and  must 
underprice issues for which favourable information is revealed by more than 
those for which unfavourable information is revealed. This leads to a prediction 
that there will only be partial adjustment of the offer price from that contained 
in the preliminary prospectus to that contained in the final prospectus. In other 
words,  the  IPOs  for  which  the  offer  price  is  revised  upwards  will  be  more 
underpriced than those for which the offer price is revised downwards (Barry, 
Gilson et al, 1998; Loughran and Ritter, 2002).  
 
A second factor which may be related to underpricing arises from the possibility 
of  retaining  shares  which  can  then  be  used  to  realise  gains  when  the  after 
market effects have occurred (Bradley and Jordan, 2002). When underpricing 
occurs, undervalued shares include only the ones actually sold to investors. The 
insiders’  retained  shares  are  valued  at  aftermarket  prices.  Therefore,  the 
economic cost per retained share (the dilution cost) decreases and economic 
gain increases with increases in ‘overhang’, where share overhang is defined as 
the ratio of pre-IPO shares retained in a firm relative to the number of shares 
filed  for  sale  to  the  public.  As  a  result,  it  is  likely  the  firms  with  greater 
overhang will allow for greater underpricing. In a related vein Loughran and 
Ritter (2002) argue that when underpricing occurs, insiders recognise that share 
value has been diluted. However, these same insiders also generally experience 
an unexpected increase in wealth. Accordingly, the existing shareholders are 
willing to “leave money on the table” for new shareholders, when the wealth 
impact can more than offset the dilution as overhang rises. Once again it is 
expected that higher overhang is associated with higher underpricing.  
 




D. Data and Variables  
 
D.1. Data Sources  
 
Our primary sources are the IPO prospectuses of 372 going public firms filed 
with the Korean Financial Supervisory Service (FSS) prior to IPO
1. The IPO   13 
prospectuses include data on market capitalisation; gross spreads; underwriting 
costs; the name of the underwriter; the history, business and operation of the 
firm;  the  ownership  structure  at  the  time  of  IPO;  names  of  venture  capital 
companies that participated in the ownership and the number and percentage of 
shares they own. IPO firms must report the identity and the shareholdings of 
venture capitalists (and other large shareholders) if they hold at least 5% of the 
total shares at IPO
2. In addition to data from the prospectuses we used data 
generously supplied by FSS on the turnover underwriting activities of Korean 
security firms for the period of 1998~2000, which enabled the calculation of 
their market shares in the Korean IPO which we use as reputation indicators.  
 
Daily stock prices for each IPO firm were generously supplied by Tong-Yang 
Securities Co who also made available annual financial statements for the IPO 
firms. 
 
The IPO offer price of each IPO firm and the daily KOSDAQ index were 
supplied by KOSDAQ. The Korean Stock Exchange provided us with daily 
KOSPI (Korea Stock Price Index) data. The IPO numbers in each year in 
KOSDAQ and KSE were obtained from the annual report published by the 
Korea Securities Dealers Association (KSDA) and the KOSDAQ website 
(http://www.kosdaq.or.kr). Information on the institutional identity of each 
venture capital company, i.e., the parent investor of the venture capital company 
was generously provided by the KVCA (Korean Venture Capital Association). 
The two-digit Korean Industry Classification (KIC) codes that we use to 
classify the 372 firms into various industry groups were obtained from the 






D.3.The Calculation of Initial Returns 
 
To estimate the effect of underpricing, initial returns are generally calculated as 
price change from the offer price to the first day closing price of the IPO stock 
(Barry, Muscarella et al, 1990; Megginson and Weiss, 1991).  
 
However, the closing price on the first day is not an appropriate measure for 
calculating  initial  returns  in  our  KOSDAQ  samples,  because  in  our  sample 
period KOSDAQ regulated daily price movements to stay within a band of plus 
or minus 12% until July 24 2000, and within 100% from July 25 2000. In many 
IPOs the closing price on the first day of trading reaches these upper limits. 
Moreover it often keeps on hitting the daily limit for several days in a row.   14 
(Kim and Park, 2002; Berkman and Lee, 2002). Therefore, instead of using the 
first-day  return  as  the  initial  return  (underpricing),  we  calculate  it  as  the 
difference between the offer price and the closing price on the first day that the 
IPO stock did not hit the daily upper limit (Kim and Park 2002). Since the 
return  is  calculated  over  several  days  we  adjust  it  by  the  movement  in  the 
KOSDAQ index between the first day of trading and the first day that the IPO 




















Where  0 i P  is the offer price of an IPO firm i,  it P  is the closing price on the first 
day that the IPO firm did not hit the daily upper limit,  0 i KQ  is the KOSDAQ 
index on the first day of the IPO stock trading, and  it KQ  is the KOSDAQ index 




Measures of VC-Backing and VC Reputation  
The presence of VC-backing for an IPO is proxied by a dummy variable (VC) 
which takes the value of 1 when a venture capital company has at least a 5% 
shareholding.  To  pick  up  reputational  effects  we  design  a  dummy  variable 
which  has  the  value  of  1  when  one  of  the  “Big  Three”  venture  capital 
companies [Korean Technology Bank (KTB), Korean Technology Investment 
(KTI), Korean Development Bank Capital (KDBC)] backs an IPO firm as the 
lead venture capitalists
3. 
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Measures of Institutional Affiliation 
We devise two mutually exclusive dummy variables that take the value of 1 if 
the lead venture capitalist of an IPO firm is affiliated respectively with a bank 
or investment bank (security company). Furthermore, in order to capture the 
effect of direct bank ownership and security firm ownership in an IPO firm 
respectively we compute two further dummy variables. The first takes the value 
of 1 when there is one or more significant bank shareholdings (i.e. 5% or over) 
in the IPO firm at the offer date and zero otherwise, and the second takes the 
value 1 when at least one investment bank (security company) has a significant 




Following  Megginson  and  Weiss  (1990)  and  Beatty  (1989)  we  construct  a 
dummy variable set equal to 1 when the underwriter is one of the largest 3 
underwriters in Korea and set equal to zero otherwise
5.  
 
IPO Firm Related Uncertainty 
To control for size effects, we employ the natural logarithm of gross proceeds. 
In a similar way, to control for age effects, we employ the natural logarithm of 
age at the time of IPO. We also include as variables the shareholdings of the 
CEO, profitability (EBIT / total assets), the liquidity ratio (total debt / total 
asset), and R&D intensity (R&D expenditure / total asset) either at or in the last 
accounting period prior to IPO High technology sector effects are captured by a 
dummy  variable  which  equals  to  1  if  an  IPO  firm  belongs  to  a  high-tech 
industry and zero otherwise
6.  
 
Hot and Cold Stock Market Effects 
To capture stock market effects, we employ three variables: the number of all 
IPOs  in  KOSDAQ  in  the  last  month  prior  to  an  IPO,  the  average  level  of 
underpricing  of  the  last  three  IPOs  prior  to  a  sample  IPO,  and  the  20-day 
cumulative market index return prior to IPO. These variables are expected to 
have  a  positive  relationship  with  underpricing.  We  also  divide  our  sample 
period at March 2000 and carry out univariate and multivariate analyses for the 
whole period and each of these subperiods up to and following the end of that 
month. 
 
Share overhang and Price Revision  
We measure share overhang as the ratio of pre-IPO shares retained in a firm 
relative to the number of shares filed for sale to the public. We measure price 
revision as the ratio of change from original offer price to final offer price. 
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E. Univariate and Bivariate Analysis  
 
E.1. IPO Firms: The Characteristics of VC and Non-VC backed IPOs 
 
Table  II  provides  a  detailed  analysis  of  the  characteristics  of  the  IPO  firms 
grouped by VC-backed and non-VC-backed status. In Panel A, a comparison of 
the  size  and  age  of  the  firms  shows  that  VC-backed  IPOs  are  smaller  and 
younger than those of non-VC-backed IPOs. The age of firms of VC-backed 
IPOs is, on average, 9.6 years, whereas that of non-VC-backed IPOs is 14.2, 
with the difference being significant at the 1% level under both the parametric 
and  non-parametric  tests.  VC-backed  firms  also  have  significantly  younger 
CEOs (47.7 years) than non-VC-backed firms (53.0 years). The smaller size of 
VC-backed  firms  over  non-VC-backed  IPOs  is  reflected  in  various  types  of 
size-related  figures:  total  assets,  total  debt,  turnover,  EBIT,  and  number  of 
employees  all  of  which  are  significantly  different  between  the  groups.  For 
instance, the total asset size of VC-backed IPOs (17.5 BW
7) is significantly 
lower than that of non-VC-backed IPOs (78.4 BW) and the turnover of VC-
backed IPOs (22.1 BW) is less than a third of that of non-VC-backed IPOs 
(67.0 BW) and they also have lower total profits measured as earnings before 
tax  and  interest  (EBIT).  They  are  however  more  profitable  in  the  last  year 
before IPO (EBIT / Total asset: 15.4% vs. 13.8%). There is, however, not a 
statistically  significant  difference  in  leverage  (Total  debt/Total  asset)  or  in 
number of members of the board of directors between the groups. The R&D 
investment of VC-backed IPOs (843.1 MW) is significantly higher than that of 
non-VC-backed IPOs (672.9 MW) on the basis of the non-parametric test. Not 
surprisingly this result combined with the fact that VC-backed IPOs are as we 
have  seen  relatively  small  means  that  they  have  significantly  higher  R&D 
intensity. Thus their R&D / Total Asset ratio is 7.7% compared with 2.8% for 
non-VC-backed  IPOs.  This  difference  no  doubt  reflects  in  part  the  fact  that 
venture  capital  backing  was  more  prevalent  in  high-tech  industries  such  as 
electronics and ICT which tend to have higher R&D investment than other low-
tech industries.  
 
Our univariate analysis also shows that VC-backed IPO recorded higher initial 
returns compared to non-VC-backed IPOs. The average initial return of VC-
backed IPOs was 202.3%, while that of non-VC-backed IPOs was 149.3%. This 
difference is significant at 10% on both a parametric and non-parametric basis. 
However, the presence of the differences between these groups of IPOs in terms 
of  size  and  age  in  particular  means  that  we  would  expect  these  inter-group 
differences to reflect in part at least the higher uncertainty of the VC backed   17 
group,  and  the  importance  of  allowing  for  these  effects  in  our  multivariate 
regression analysis. 
 
Panel B compares offering statistics between VC-backed IPOs and non-VC-
backed  IPOs.  As  might  be  expected  from  panel  A,  VC-backed  IPOs  have 
smaller market capitalisation volume and gross proceeds than non-VC-backed 
IPOs. Thus the market capitalisation (offer price multiplied by the number of 
shares offered), of VC-backed IPOs (54.8 BW) is significantly smaller than that 
of non-VC-backed IPOs (98.4 BW) and the proceeds figures show that VC-
backed IPOs attracted a lower amount of money at IPO (11.6 BW) than non-
VC-backed IPOs (16.5 BW). Given these smaller gross proceeds, VC-backed 
IPO firms paid less underwriting fees (368.8 MW) relative to non-VC-backed 
IPOs firms (374.3 MW). The lower book-to-market ratio of VC-backed IPOs 
(0.3) relative to non-VC-backed IPOs (0.6) reflects the findings in Panel A that 
VC-backed IPOs recorded greater initial returns than did non-VC-backed IPOs. 
Non-VC backed IPOs were less costly in terms of underwriters’ fees in both 
absolute terms and relative to gross proceeds although only the latter difference 
was statistically significant. Both the overhang and price revision variables are 
significantly higher for VC backed IPOs. Since we expect both these variables 
to also be associated independently with underpricing, it is important to allow 
for their impact in identifying the impact of VC backing per se. 
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Table II   Descriptive Firm and Offering Statistics of All, VC-backed and 
                     non-VC-backed IPOs on KOSDAQ 1999~2001 
 
BM  and  MW  indicate  billion  Won  and  million  Won  (Korean  currency),  respectively. 
















Median         
A. Firm Characteristics               
Age (Year)  12.1   9.6   14.2   -5.7   ***  -5.6   *** 
  9.7   8.1   11.9          
Total asset (BW)  50.0   17.5   78.4   -2.5   **  -4.5   *** 
  14.9   12.8   18.1          
Total debt (BW)  33.6   9.4   54.7   -2.1   **  -3.8   *** 
  7.5   6.1   8.5          
Turnover (BW)  46.1   22.1   67.0   -3.3   ***  -4.2   *** 
  16.7   13.9   20.3          
EBIT (BW)  2.8   2.4   3.1   -0.8     -2.8   *** 
  1.9   1.8   2.1          
EBIT / Total asset (%)  14.6   15.4   13.8   1.3     2.1   ** 
  13.1   13.9   11.8          
Total debt / Total asset (%)  49.3   49.6   49.1   0.3     0.3    
  50.1   50.1   49.8          
R&D (MW)  752.2  843.1  672.9  0.8    4.0  *** 
  240.6  364.6  118.8         
R&D intensity(R&D/Total Asset) (%)  5.1  7.7  2.8  4.1  ***  5.1  *** 
  1.0  2.9  0.3         
Age of CEO  50.5   47.7   53.0   -5.6   ***  -5.3   *** 
  49.4   46.4   53.2          
Number of board of directors  6.6   6.3   6.9   -2.2   **  -0.8    
  6.0   6.0   6.0          
Number of employees  180.7   105.0   246.4   -3.9   ***  -5.0   *** 
  93.0   77.0   115.0          
Initial return (%)  174.0   202.3   149.3   2.1   **  1.8   * 
  105.2   119.4   100.0          
B. Offering Statistics                
Market value of equity (BW)  78.1   54.8   98.4   -1.2     -3.6   *** 
  27.4   33.5   22.5          
Gross proceeds (BW)  14.2   11.6   16.5   -1.4     -2.9   *** 
  6.7   7.6   5.4          
Book-to-market ratio   0.4   0.3   0.6   -6.4   ***  -7.2   *** 
  0.3   0.2   0.4          
Underwriting Fees (MW)  371.7   368.8   374.3   -0.1     -1.8   * 
  237.3   261.7   210.0          
Underwriting Fees / Gross Proceeds(%)  3.9   3.6   4.1   -2.2   **  -2.3   ** 
  3.8   3.5   4.0          
Price revision (%)  13.4   23.2   4.8   5.0   ***  5.3   *** 
  12.5   20.0   0.0          
Share overhang  3.4   3.6   3.3   2.4   **  2.3   ** 
  3.8   3.9   3.6          
Number of observations  (372)   (173)   (199)          
Source: IPO prospectuses and financial data provided by Korean Information System   19 
E.2. The Ownership Structure of VC backed and Non –VC backed IPO firms 
 
Table III is based on an analysis of shareholdings of 5% or more in VC backed 
and Non-VC backed groups of IPO firms at the date of the offering as disclosed 
in the IPO prospectus. We separately identify seven types of holder; CEO, CEO 
family,  board  of  directors  as  a  whole,  venture  capitalists,  other  industrial 
companies (corporate venture holders) commercial banks, and investment banks 
(security firms). 
 
By construction the VC backed group has a higher proportion of VC holdings. 
In both groups of IPOs, however, the largest single significant shareholder is the 
CEO and there is no difference between the groups in the typical size of this 
holding which accounts for just less than a third of all the shares. In the case of 
VC backed IPOs, this is, on average, twice the typical VC holding of 15.1%. 
This latter figure is quite low, when compared with the average holding of US 
venture capitalist at IPO (holdings of over a third are for instance reported in 
Megginson and Weiss (1991)). Board of directors holdings excluding the CEO 
do  not  differ  significantly  between  VC-backed  IPOs  (7.8%)  and  non-VC-
backed IPOs (9.7%). However, the average shareholdings of the CEO’s family 
do show a significant difference (6.1% for VC-backed IPOs, 13.0% for non-
VC-backed IPOs). As a result the sum of shareholdings of CEO, CEO family 
and the Board does differ significantly (VC-backed IPOs (46.2%) and non-VC-
backed IPOs (54.4%))  
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Table III   Ownership Structure of Pre-IPO 

















CEO stake (%)  32.2   31.9   0.18     0.65    
  32.8   31.7          
CEO's family stake (%)  6.1   13.0   -4.60   *** -3.13   *** 
  1.4   5.7          
Board of directors stake (%)  7.8   9.7   -1.35     -0.86    
  4.2   2.3          
Insider stake (%)  46.2  54.4  -3.05  *** -3.41  *** 
(CEO+ family + BoD)  48.0  57.1         
Corporate stake (%)  5.2   14.0   -4.00   *** -3.74   *** 
  0.0   0.0          
Venture capitalists stake (%)  15.1   0.0   26.06   *** 18.00   *** 
  13.5   0.0          
Banks stake (%)  1.3   0.7   1.25     2.11   ** 
  0.0   0.0          
Security company stake (%)  1.6   2.2   -0.88     -0.16    
  0.0   0.0          
 
   Source: IPO prospectuses 
 
Corporate stakes accounted for only 5.2% of total shareholdings of VC-backed 
IPOs compared with 14.0% of those of non-VC-backed group. This difference 
is significant at the 1% level. Banks and security firms have small holdings of 
2% or less and the differences between the groups are significant only on the 
basis of a non-parametric test suggesting higher bank holdings in VC-backed-
IPOs. Non-VC-backed firms appear therefore to be more closely held in family 
terms and have higher holdings by other non-financial companies in their equity.  
 
 
E.3. Underpricing: The effects of VC-backing, market conditions, age, size and 
sector  
 
Table IV compares underpricing between VC and Non-VC backed firms, stock 
market conditions, firm age, firm size and the sector of the IPO. The first row 
replicates, for comparison purposes, our overall underpricing result from Table 
III.  
Table IV shows that IPO firms brought to the stock market in the hot issue 
period (up until March 2000) recorded significantly higher initial returns (2.80)   21 
on average than those (1.19) in the cold issue market (after March 2000). This 
result  clearly  shows  that  initial  returns  are  closely  correlated  with  market 
conditions, as argued in Ibbotson, Sindelar et al. (1994) and Lowry and Schwert 
(2002). Market conditions thus seem to influence the initial returns in the bank-
based Korean system much as in other stock market based financial systems.  
 
The initial returns of young firms (2.05) are statistically significantly higher 
those than of old firms (1.43). This is consistent with the view that investors 
require  a  greater  risk  premium  for  young  firms  that  generally  have  more 
uncertain  prospects  than  established  firms.  The  average  initial  return  of  the 
small  market  capitalisation  group  (1.98)  also  turns  out  to  be  statistically 
significantly higher than that of large market capitalisation group (1.50). This 
evidence also appears to show that investors demand a higher risk premium on 
the IPOs of small firms that are recognised as more uncertain and risky than big 
firms.  
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Table IV  Underpricing by Different Types of IPOs on KOSDAQ 
    1999-2001 
 
KOSDAQ IPO samples are divided into two groups respectively as: (1) VC-backed Firms 
(when any venture capitalist owns 5% or more of total shares of an IPO firm) and Non-VC-
backed Firms; (2) Hot Market issue (when an IPO was listed in KOSDAQ in the period up to 
March 2000) and Cold Market issue (after March 2000); (3) Young firms (when the age of 
firm is equal to or less than the median value, 9.6 years) and Old firms; (4) Small firms 
(when the market capitalisation calculated as the offer price multiplied by the number of 
shares is equal to or less than the median value, 2.4 billion Won) and Big firms; (5) High-
tech firms (which include Other Machinery and Equipment (KIC 29), Computers and Office 
Machinery (30) Electrical Machinery and Apparatuses (31) Electronic Components, Radio, 
Television (32) Medical, Precision and Optical Instruments (33), and Computer and Related 
Activities (72) as was defined in Chapter 4) and Non-high-tech firms. These different types 
of groupings apply to the remaining parts of the chapter. Asterisks denote significance levels 
at the level 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*). 
 
  Mean  Median  Mean  Median T-statistic  Mann-
Whitney U 
(A) Venture-capital-backing 
  VC-backed  Non-VC-backed         
Underpricing 2.02  1.19  1.49  1.00  2.15  **  1.79  * 
(No. IPOs)  (173)    (199)           
(B) Hot Market Issue 
  Hot Market  Cold Market         
Underpricing 2.80  2.14  1.19  0.89  6.54  *** 6.20  *** 
(No. IPOs)  (127)    (245)           
(C) Age 
  Young  Old         
Underpricing 2.05  1.23  1.43  1.00  2.50  **  2.45  ** 
(No. IPOs)  (186)    (186)           
(D) Market Capitalisation 
  Small  Big         
Underpricing 1.98  1.36  1.50  0.82  1.96  *  4.15  *** 
(No. IPOs)  (186)    (186)           
(E) Industry 
  High-tech  Non-high-tech         
Underpricing 1.77  1.07  1.70  1.00  0.28    0.01   
(No. IPOs)  (232)    (140)           
Source: Korean Information System, IPO prospectuses    23 
There is, however, no significant difference in initial returns for high-tech and 
non-high-tech companies. The underpricing of the high-tech industry group is 
1.77, compared with 1.70 for the non-high-tech group. This is an interesting 
result,  because  high-tech  stocks  (especially  relating  to  information  and 
communication technology) showed a higher initial return than non-high-tech 
stocks in late 1990s and the first-quarter of 2000 in the US (Schultz and Zaman, 
2001).  
 
E.4. Underpricing by VC-backed and non-VC-backed IPOs: Bivariate Analysis 
 
In this section, we display a bivariate analysis of underpricing by VC-backed 
IPOs  and  non-VC-backed  IPOs  respectively  cross-classified  by  market 
condition, age, market capitalisation and industry.  
 
Panel  A  of  Table  V  shows  that  the  initial  return  of  VC-backed  firms  is 
statistically significantly higher in the hot market (3.61) than in the cold market 
(1.11). Although the initial return of non-VC-backed firms is also higher in the 
hot market (2.00) than in the cold market (1.25), the difference of the initial 
returns is not as severe as in the case of VC-backed firms. But, the difference is 
still significant at the 5% level. This tendency for the initial return to be higher 
in the hot market regardless of VC-backing clearly shows that the high initial 
returns of the whole sample in KOSDAQ might be driven by the overreaction of 
investors in the hot market (Kim and Park, 2002). However, the final two rows 
of Panel A show that VC backed firms were significantly more underpriced 
than  Non-VC  backed  firms  in  only  the  hot  market.  VC  backing  has  no 
significant  impact  in  the  cold  period.  In  Panel  B,  young  firms  show  higher 
returns than old firms in both VC-backed and non-VC-backed IPOs. The initial 
return of young firms in the VC-backing group is 2.37, compared with 1.41 of 
old firms in the same group. The difference of the initial returns is significant at 
the 5% level using the t-test. For non-VC-backed firms, the difference of initial 
returns between young firms (1.58) and old firms (1.44) is no less acute than the 
case of VC-backed firms, but the difference is only significant at the 10% level 
using the Mann-Whitney test. The final two rows of Panel B show, however, 
that VC backing only has an effect on underpricing within the younger group. It 
does not appear to have an impact amongst older firms. In Panel C we find that 
small firms have statistically significantly higher underpricing than large firms 
for both the VC-backed and the non-VC-backed firms. Moreover, as the results 
in the final two rows of the Panel show VC backing is associated with higher 
underpricing irrespective of size. 
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Table V  IPO Underpricing by VC-backing and Non-VC-backing  
Classified by State of the Market, Age, Market Capitalisation and Industry 
on KOSDAQ 1999~2001 
Asterisks denote significance levels at the level of 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*). 
 
  Mean  Median  Mean  Median  T-statistic  Mann-Whitney 
U 
Panel A: Hot Market Issue 
  Hot market  Cold market         
VC-backing 3.61   2.38   1.11   0.76   6.51   ***  6.73   *** 
(No. IPOs)  (63)    (110)           
Non-VC-
backing  2.00   1.34   1.25   1.00   2.48  **  2.07   ** 
(No. IPOs)  (64)    (135)           
T-statistic  2.84  ***  -0.74           
MW U   3.50  ***  0.84           
Panel B: Age 
  Young  Old         
VC-backing 2.37   1.22   1.41   1.07   2.25   **  1.30    
(No. IPOs)  (111)    (62)           
Non-VC-
backing  1.58   1.24   1.44   0.93   0.44    1.68   * 
(No. IPOs)  (75)    (124)           
T-statistic  2.01  **  -0.10           
MW U   0.79    1.07           
Panel C: Market Capitalisation 
  Small  Big         
VC-backing 2.42   1.84   1.77   0.93   1.55     3.59   *** 
(No. IPOs)  (67)    (106)           
Non-VC-
backing  1.73   1.20   1.14   0.61   2.03  **  2.97   *** 
(No. IPOs)  (119)    (80)           
T-statistic  2.07  **  1.70  *         
MW U   2.51  **  1.54           
Panel D: Industry 
  High-tech  Non-high-tech       
VC-backing 1.93   1.19   2.34   1.17   -0.84     -1.22    
(No. IPOs)  (133)    (40)           
Non-VC-
backing  1.55   1.02   1.44   0.98   0.38     0.39    
(No. IPOs)  (99)    (100)           
T-statistic  1.17    2.15  **         
MW U   0.78    2.15  **         
Source: Korean Information System, IPO prospectuses    25 
Finally, Panel D shows insignificant differences in the average initial return 
between high-tech firms and non-high-tech firms whether or not they are VC 
backed.  However,  within  the  high-tech  group  there  is  significantly  higher 
underpricing in the VC-backed group. Thus the VC backed group are associated 
with those high tech IPOs displaying the highest initial returns.  
 
E.5. Underpricing by Types of Institutional Affiliation of the VC-backers of IPO 
firms 
 
Table VI repeats the analysis of the previous section but this time in the context 
of testing for differences within the VC backed group distinguishing between 
bank-affiliated VC-backed IPOs, security company-affiliated VC-backed IPOs, 
other  institution-affiliated  VC-backed  IPOs  (excluding  bank-affiliated  and 
security company-affiliated) and non-VC-backed IPOs. The initial returns are 
compared  among  these  four  groups  for  all  IPO  firms,  cross  classified  by 
whether  their  IPO  firms  were  brought  to  market  in  the  hot  or  cold  market 
periods, respectively.  
 
The first row of Table VI shows that the initial return of the bank-affiliated 
group is 2.33, followed by 2.06 of the other institution-affiliated, 1.49 for the 
non-VC-backed  and  1.29  for  the  security  company-affiliated  group.  The 
difference  of  the  initial  returns  is,  however,  significant  only  between  other 
institution-affiliated  VC  and  non-VC-backed.  There  is  thus  no  evidence  of 
certifying effects on this basis. 
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Table VI   Underpricing by Institutional Type of VC-backing on  
    KOSDAQ 1999~2001 
Note 1) Significance of mean difference between groups (Kruskal-Wallis test)
 8 













  Mean  Median  Mean  Median  Mean  Median  Mean  Median   
(A) Total 
  (a)  (b)  (c)  (d)   
Underpricing  2.33   1.26   1.29   1.19   2.06  1.15   1.49   1.00  c>d at 10% 
(No. IPOs)  (32)     (19)     (122)     (199)      
(B) Hot Market 
  (e)  (f)  (g)  (h)   
Underpricing  4.68   4.43   1.48   2.00   3.54   2.38  2.00   1.34 
(No. IPOs)  (13)     (5)     (45)     (64)    
e>f at 5% 
e>g at 10% 
e>h at 1% 
g>h at 1% 
 
(C) Cold Market 
  (i)  (j)  (k)  (l)   
Underpricing  0.72   0.58   1.22   0.86  1.19   0.89  1.25   1.00   
(No. IPOs)  (19)     (14)     (77)     (135)      
Significance
2)  e>i at 1%    g>k at 1%  h>l at 5%    
Source: Korean Information System, IPO prospectuses  
 
The second panel shows that in the hot market bank-affiliation is statistically 
significantly associated with higher underpricing than in any of the other three 
groups. The final panel shows that there are no significant differences in the 
cold market. The final row of the Table shows that for each group of VC firms, 
except  for  those  which  are  investment  bank  (security  firm)  affiliated, 
underpricing was higher in the hot than the cold market. So all these groups 
were affected in the same direction by the market conditions. 
 
 
F. Multivariate Analysis 
 
F.1. Multivariate Regression Models 
 
We  construct  three  regression  models.  In  estimating  each  we  regress 
independent  dummy  variables  capturing  VC  backing  effects  and  our  other 
reputation ownership and control variables against underpricing (initial returns).   27 
Model 1 tests for the impact of VC-backing. Model 2 tests for the impact of 
VC-reputation.  Model  3  tests  for  the  institutional  affiliation  of  VC-backing. 
Each of the three regressions is estimated with a constant term and include the 
variables controlling respectively for the effect of IPO company characteristics, 
offering characteristics and stock market conditions. All results presented are 
shown with heteroskedastic robust standard errors. The three regression models 
are estimated for three time periods: the whole sample from April 1999 to end 
September 2001; the hot market sub period from April 1999 to end March 2000; 




In Table VII, in the whole sample taking all three regression models together 
we find that none of the VC reputational backing or affiliation variables has a 
statistically significant effect upon underpricing. Thus in a multivariate context 
for  the  whole  period  the  univariate  findings  of  VC  related  certifying  or 
reputational  effects  disappear.  Only  the  investment  bank  (security  company) 
affiliated indicator shows an impact that is statistically significant. It is however 
the opposite of that predicted by the literature since in Model 3 its presence 
reduces  underpricing.  Underwriter  reputation  has  an  insignificantly  but 
correctly signed negative impact.  
 
As  far  as  the  control  variables  are  concerned,  a  number  of  clear  findings 
emerge.  Age  and  gross  proceeds  are  significantly  negatively  related  to 
underpricing in all three model specifications. The age and size results are thus 
consistent with the negative impact of maturity and scale on underpricing as a 
result of lower uncertainty. CEO stake is also negatively related to underpricing 
in some runs but becomes insignificant when other share ownership variables 
are added. The table also shows that proximate stock market conditions are 
closely related to underpricing. The cumulative market index return has a strong 
positive  relationship  with  underpricing.  As  was  also  expected,  offer  price 
revision is positively related to underpricing at the 1% level. Overhang has no 
effect. Cumulative share price movements have the expected positive sign and 
are  significant,  whilst  contemporary  pricing  movements  are,  as  predicted, 
positive but insignificantly so. Profitability leverage and R&D also have the 




Table VII   OLS Regression on Underpricing for KOSDAQ IPOs in  
    the Whole Market 
Regression for underpricing in the whole market. Variables are defined as are specified in the table. All coefficients’ t-statistics in the 
parentheses are heteroskedasticity consistent. Asterisks beside t-statistics *, **, *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively.  
 
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3 
Age (ln)  -0.36  (-1.93)  *  -0.36  (-1.86)  *  -0.41  (-2.16)  ** 
Gross proceeds (ln)  -0.42  (-4.38)  ***  -0.43  (-4.24)  ***  -0.43  (-4.36)  *** 
CEO stake  -0.98  (-1.76)  *  -0.97  (-1.87)  *  -0.82  (-1.43)   
EBIT / Total asset  -0.48  (-0.47)    -0.45  (-0.48)    -0.23  (-0.21)   
Total debt / Total asset  1.34  (1.59)    1.34  (1.57)    1.36  (1.55)   
High tech dummy  -0.08  (-0.30)    -0.08  (-0.32)    -0.10  (-0.38)   
R&D intensity(R&D expenditure/Total asset)  1.40  (0.87)    1.41  (0.90)    1.52  (0.96)   
IPO Number of last month prior to IPO  -0.01  (-1.44)    -0.01  (-1.44)    -0.01  (-1.43)   
Contemporary underpricing  0.12  (1.41)    0.12  (1.43)    0.11  (1.30)   
Cumulative market index return (20 day)  3.44  (3.55)  ***  3.42  (3.56)  ***  3.45  (3.63)  *** 
Share overhang  0.15  (1.43)    0.15  (1.42)    0.15  (1.42)   
Price revision  1.34  (3.33)  ***  1.34  (3.24)  ***  1.33  (3.08)  *** 
VC-backed  0.00  (0.02)               
Top 3 tier VCs-backed        0.07  (0.18)         
Bank-affiliated VC-backed              0.15  (0.29)   
Security company-affiliated VC-backed              -0.61  (-2.01)  ** 
Bank has shareholding              -0.02  (-0.06)   
Security company has shareholding              0.42  (0.88)   
Top 3 tier underwriters involved  -0.20  (-0.57)    -0.19  (-0.57)    -0.17  (-0.48)   
Constant  11.64  (4.27)  ***  11.66  (4.10)  ***  11.81  (4.36)  *** 
Probability > F  0.00      0.00      0.00     
Adjusted R-square  0.22      0.22      0.23     
No. of IPOs  372      372      372       29 
Disaggregating  the  results  by  time  period  yields  important  differences  and 
suggests that the overall period results aggregate across two rather different 
market regimes. In Table VIII covering the hot market period, the regression 
results for the VC backing, affiliation and reputational variables are generally 
consistent with those of the whole market period yielding insignificant effects. 
Once  again  the  investment  bank  (security  company)  variable  is  statistically 
significantly negatively related to underpricing. Stock market situation variables 
are as before also positively related to underpricing. The cumulative market 
index return is very strongly related to the underpricing (coefficients ranging 
from 4.74 to 4.85 with t-statistics from 2.16 to 2.22). Price revision is also 
found to have a strongly positive relationship with underpricing. Amongst the 
control  variables,  the  most  notable  change  is  the  increased  value  and 
significance of the coefficients on age. In hot market conditions it appears that 
maturity becomes a more potent indicator of reduced uncertainty. Size, on the 
other hand, becomes insignificant. The other variables are similar in size and 
significance as they were for the whole period estimation. 
 
In the cold market period results shown in Table VIII, the most striking change 
in  the  regression  results  is  in  the  behaviour  of  the  VC  ownership  variable. 
Although the significance of VC-backing per se remains insignificant in Model 
1, in the other two models, the VC-reputation and bank-affiliated VC variables 
exhibit significantly negative coefficients. Bank shareholding is also found to 
reduce  underpricing  at  the  10%  level.  Security  company  affiliation  effects 
disappear whilst the underwriter reputational variable becomes significant and 
with  the  expected  negative  sign.  It  thus  appears  that  in  the  more  stable 
conditions of the cold market there are as predicted by the certification and 
reputation models significant effects leading to reduced underpricing linked to 
bank affiliated VC backing, VC reputation and underwriter reputation. 
 
The main changes in the other variables are that age and size have the correct 
negative signs as uncertainty reducing factors although in this case it is size 
which is statistically significant. The price revision positive impact is reinforced 
as is the impact of the proximate stock price movement variables. The number 
of IPOs in the previous month becomes significantly negative.   
 
  
Table VIII  OLS Regression on Underpricing for KOSDAQ IPOs in the Hot and Cold Markets 
Regression for underpricing in the hot market and the cold market that are divided by whether the IPO were listed before/after April 2000. Variables are 
defined as are specified in the table. All coefficients’ t-statistics in the parentheses are heteroskedasticity consistent. Asterisks beside t-statistics *, **, 
*** denote significance at 10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively.  
 
  Hot Market  Cold Market 
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3 
Age (ln)  -1.24  (-2.75) ***  -1.24  (-2.72) ***  -1.23  (-2.72) ***  0.03  (0.23)    0.03  (0.23)    0.03  (0.22)   
Gross proceeds (ln)  -0.18  (-0.96)    -0.18  (-0.95)    -0.14  (-0.79)    -0.61  (-5.95) ***  -0.60  (-5.96)  ***  -0.63  (-5.99) *** 
CEO stake  -1.88  (-1.36)    -1.77  (-1.61)    -1.58  (-1.24)    -0.23  (-0.64)    -0.28  (-0.78)    -0.24  (-0.64)   
EBIT / Total asset  1.10  (0.48)    1.18  (0.56)    0.99  (0.41)    0.47  (0.99)    0.28  (0.54)    0.49  (0.98)   
Total debt / Total asset  2.14  (1.22)    2.13  (1.22)    2.16  (1.09)    -0.27  (-0.88)    -0.23  (-0.77)    -0.17  (-0.54)   
High-tech dummy  0.50  (0.93)    0.47  (0.84)    0.45  (0.84)    -0.27  (-1.35)    -0.28  (-1.46)    -0.27  (-1.40)   
R&D intensity(R&D 
expenditure/Total asset) 
2.75  (0.93)    2.76  (1.01)    2.87  (1.02)    0.61  (0.85)    0.50  (0.69)    0.57  (0.77)   
IPO Number of last month prior 
to IPO 
-0.02  (-1.52)    -0.02  (-1.48)    -0.02  (-1.47)    -0.04  (-3.87) ***  -0.04  (-3.88)  ***  -0.04  (-3.88) *** 
Contemporary underpricing  -0.21  (-1.62)    -0.20  (-1.64)    -0.20  (-1.70)  *  0.25  (3.74) ***  0.25  (3.87)  ***  0.25  (3.93) *** 
Cumulative market index return 
(20 day) 
4.85  (2.21)  **  4.91  (2.22)  **  4.74  (2.16)  **  1.18  (2.92) ***  1.29  (3.17)  ***  1.11  (2.71) *** 
Share overhang  0.20  (1.12)    0.19  (1.05)    0.19  (1.02)    -0.01  (-0.13)    0.00  (-0.01)    0.00  (0.01)   
Price revision  2.53  (1.94)  *  2.54  (1.92)  *  2.35  (1.61)    0.97  (3.12) ***  1.00  (3.03)  ***  0.98  (3.04) *** 
VC-backed  0.00  (0.00)                -0.08  (-0.51)               
Top 3 tier VCs-backed        0.27  (0.34)                -0.39  (-2.00)  **       
Bank-affiliated VC-backed              0.71  (0.62)                -0.29  (-1.86)  * 
Security company-affiliated 
VC-backed 
            -1.77  (-2.34)  **              0.10  (0.39)   
A bank has shareholding              0.30  (0.28)                -0.38  (-1.91)  * 
A security company has 
shareholding 
            0.44  (0.36)                0.23  (1.35)   
Top 3 tier underwriters 
involved 
0.22  (0.27)    0.20  (0.26)    0.30  (0.35)    -0.33  (-2.04)  **  -0.36  (-2.27)  **  -0.32  (-2.05)  ** 
Constant  8.48  (1.56)    8.49  (1.54)    7.35  (1.45)    15.88  (6.46) ***  15.74  (6.43)  ***  16.25  (6.44) *** 
Probability > F  0.00      0.00      0.00      0.00      0.00      0.00     
Adjusted R-square  0.29      0.29      0.31      0.38      0.39      0.39     
No. of IPOs  127     127     127      245      245      245      
  31 
It seems that, in hot market contagion conditions where the demand for shares 
exceeds  the  supply,  the  certifying  and  reputation  effects  predicted  to  be 
associated with VC backing and various reputational variables associated with 
underwriter reputation and bank backing count for nothing. There is nothing in 
a name and any IPO rose smells just as sweet. A name does not matter in hot 
markets. In the cold market, the scope for a reputable financial player’s name to 
sweeten an IPO rose can lower the degree of underpricing (Carter and Manaster, 
1990).  The  significantly  negative  relationship  of  bank-affiliated  VC,  VC 
reputation and underwriter reputation to underpricing in cold markets is thus 
consistent with the predictions of the reputational and certifying predictions of 
the information asymmetry models. These models do not hold however in the 





In  this  paper  we  tested  the  propositions  that  VC-backing,  the  reputation  of 
venture capitalists and the institutional affiliation of VC-backers would reduce 
IPO underpricing. We tested these propositions on a large sample of IPOs on 
KOSDAQ over the period of 1999~2001. Our analysis controlled for a wide 
range  of  control  and  other  variables  that  affect  underpricing  and  we 
distinguished two sub-periods of analysis corresponding to hot and cold market 
conditions. We found that the hypothesized venture capital participation and 
reputational effects occurred only in cold market conditions and that the whole 
period results represented the aggregation of two rather different regimes. In the 
hot market, it appears that names make very little difference as everyone is 
swept  up  in  the  contagion.  Only  maturity  and  investment  bank  (security 
company)  backing  afforded  any  downward  pressure  on  underpricing,  and 
overall  underpricing  was  at  its  peak.  In  the  cold  market  behaviour  more 
consistent with the conventional asymmetric pricing models emerges the name 
does matter.   




1  We do not consider in this paper venture capital investments realised  by 
M&A or other exit routes other than IPO. 
2 If the venture capitalists invest less than 5% in the IPO firm they do not appear 
in the ownership section of the  IPO prospectus. Where the venture capitalists 
own less than a 5% share of an IPO firm, the firm is classified as ‘non-VC-
backed’ in our analysis. Holdings of less than 5% may indicate that the venture 
capitalists  are  not  interested  in  the  management  of  the  IPO  firm  as  minor 
shareholders.  In  this  case,  they  are  considered  as  not  contributing  to  the 
certification of the firm or adding value.  
3 KTB, KTI and KDBC, account for  the majority of Korean venture capital 
financing. Differences in the extent of VC-backing and the reputation of the 
venture capitalist have been proxied elsewhere by representation on the board of 
directors  Barry,  Muscarella  et  al,  1990),  pre-  and  post-issue  equity  shares 
owned by venture capitalists (Field and Hanka, 2000), the number of venture 
capitalists having equity position in the IPO firm (Gompers, 1995), the age of 
lead venture capitalist at the time of IPO (Gompers, 1996) or in the same spirit 
as here by a dummy variable representing  market share of IPOs (Beatty, 1989). 
4 There were no cases in the sample when both a security firm and a bank held a 
significant shareholding as defined in this study.  
5 The big three underwriters Investment and Security, Daishin Securities and 
Samsung Securities Co. account for over 50% of the market where we measure 
the  market  share  by  dividing  the  whole  gross  proceeds  of  the  IPO  firms  
sponsored by an underwriter by the sum of the gross proceeds of all the IPO 
firms.  
6 The classification of high-tech industry and non-high-tech industry follows 
that  in  Loughran  and  Ritter  (2001).  The  high-tech  industries  include  Other 
Machinery  and  Equipment  (Korean  Industry  Classification  Code  29), 
Computers and Office Machinery (30) Electrical Machinery and Apparatuses 
(31)  Electronic  Components,  Radio,  Television  (32)  Medical,  Precision  and 
Optical Instruments (33),  Computer and Related Activities (72).  
7 BW: Billion Won, MW: Million Won 
8 In this and following tables where comparisons are made across more than two 
categories we use the non-parametric Kruskal-Wallis test. If, and only if, this 
test reveals the presence of statistically significant differences across the groups 
as  a  whole  a  simple  extension  permits  a  series  of  tests  of  all  pair  wise 
comparisons  across  the  groups  (Conover,  1980,  pp  229-237).  The  results  of 
such pair wise tests are reported accordingly.  
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